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Abstract:  StarLink corn, a biotech variety not approved for human food use, disrupted the
marketing system in 2000 because of inadvertent commingling.  Testing protocols have since
been established for detection of StarLink in corn shipments to Japan.  Domestic food
manufacturers, anxious to avoid risks of contamination and product recalls, also test for StarLink
kernels.  This paper provides an overview of the economics of testing.  What are the risks facing
buyers and sellers, and how are these influenced by different testing protocols?  How do market
premiums and discounts, testing costs, and prior beliefs affect the incentives to test?  A
conceptual model is developed in which sellers can choose whether to pre-test grain prior to
shipment.  Simulation analysis is used to illustrate the impact of market premiums and other
variables on testing incentives and buyer risk.
The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Gerald Plato, William Chambers, Mike Price,
and David Skully.  Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the Economic Research Service or the U.S. Department of Agriculture.2
Introduction
The emergence of markets for non-biotech grains has created demand for grain testing
and stimulated development of new testing methods.  Buyers who wish to avoid biotech grain
can make use of commercially available diagnostic tests.  These allow detection of specified
transgenic events (DNA or protein) in grain samples with levels of accuracy that have been
verified by USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA). While
statistical aspects of grain testing have been examined previously (see, e.g., Remund et al.), there
is relatively little literature on the economic incentives and risks associated with testing for
biotech content. This paper places testing within an economic context.  What is the economic
value of information gained through testing?  What are the tradeoffs between testing costs,
accuracy, and risks to buyers and sellers?   How are risks affected by testing protocols, market
premiums and discounts, and agents’ beliefs about the true concentration of biotech content?
The conceptual model is applied to testing for StarLink corn, a biotech variety not approved for
food use that became inadvertently commingled with other corn supplies in 2000, leading to
product recalls and the disruption of U.S. corn exports.
1
The paper begins with a review of statistical concepts and a summary of recent test
results for StarLink.  We then discuss testing within a Bayesian framework, and present a
conceptual model in which sellers can make a strategic choice about whether to test grain prior to
shipment.  Incentives for testing and implications for buyer risks are investigated in a simulation
exercise.  The paper concludes with a short discussion of results.
                                                
1 See Lin, et al. for analysis of the market and trade impacts of StarLink.3
Testing for presence of biotech kernels
In the following discussion, we assume that the buyer’s acceptance of a shipment is
contingent on a test indicating zero (or a very low concentration of) biotech kernels.  Tests for
the presence of biotech kernels involve the binomial distribution.  Let n denote the number of
kernels in a random sample, and let g denote the true concentration of biotech kernels (in a grain
lot from which the sample is drawn).  The probability of exactly x biotech kernels in a random
sample is
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A qualitative test establishes the presence or absence of biotech kernels; that is the type most
often used by grain traders.  (Quantitative tests, which estimate the proportion of biotech kernels
in a sample, are much more costly and time consuming.)  For a qualitative test, x = 0 and the
chance of acceptance is B(0;n,g).  The chance that grain will be rejected due to presence of
biotech kernels is 1 – B(0;n,g).   Figure 1 shows the relationship between chance of acceptance
and sample size based on a single sample plan.
A single large sample serves the buyer's interest well if the buyer is willing to accept a
low concentration of biotech kernels, but not a high concentration.  However, under a single
sample plan, the risk of rejecting lots that are actually acceptable is greater for the seller with a
larger sample size.  Decreasing the sample size would lower this risk.  Hence, increasing the




















Figure 1:  Impact of sample size on probability of acceptance.
An alternative is to implement a multiple sample plan.  Suppose there are m independent
samples, each with n kernels.  The buyer agrees to accept the grain if there are no more than r
positive test results (0 ≤ r < m).  In this case, the probability of acceptance is
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where q is the probability of rejecting one sample
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Application to StarLink
For export shipments to Japan, the official testing protocol for StarLink (developed by
USDA-GIPSA in consultation with Japanese authorities in November 2000) involves three corn
sub-samples (m=3) of 800 kernels each.  This plan is based on sampling and testing5
recommendations of GIPSA and the Food and Drug Administration, but it also reflects the
limitations of production and handling processes and current testing technology.  At present, the
detection sensitivity reaches 0.125 percent (1 StarLink kernel in 800) for most test kits.
Figure 2 shows the chance of accepting grain for alternate values of r.  Setting r=0 allows
none of the three samples to indicate presence of StarLink.  Less stringent requirements (r=1, or
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Figure 2: Probability of acceptance under multiple sample protocol for corn exports.
When no positive results are allowed (r=0), the buyer has 99 percent confidence that the actual
StarLink concentration (g) does not exceed 0.19 percent.
2  Put another way, the chance that the
concentration exceeds 0.19 percent is no more than 1 percent.   For a chosen confidence level,
                                                
2 For the 99% confidence level, the maximum concentration is the value of g that solves B(r;m,q) =  0.01, where q is
the probability of rejection for an individual sample, q=1-B(0;n,g).  This may be represented graphically in Figure 26
the maximum concentration rises as the requirement becomes less stringent.  When r=3, the
maximum concentration jumps to 100 percent.  When three samples test positive, there can be no
meaningful inference about the maximum concentration of StarLink in a corn shipment.
Table 1.  Maximum StarLink concentrations based on n=800 and m=3












0 0.19 0.10 0.03
1 0.35 0.20 0.09
2 0.71 0.42 0.20
3 100.0 100.0 100.0
These calculations require no prior information about the distribution of StarLink in corn
being tested.  For a chosen confidence level, the maximum concentration level provides a kind of
worst-case assessment of buyer risk; it may be substantially higher than the expected
concentration of StarLink kernels, given other information.   To illustrate this distinction, we use
information in Table 2 to derive an estimate of the mean StarLink level in corn tested during the
past year.  Based on test results, the overall probability of a sample testing positive was
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by drawing a horizontal line at prob = 0.01; the maximum concentration is determined by the intersection of this line
with an acceptance curve.
3 This can be done using SOLVER in an Excel spreadsheet.7
provides an estimate of the underlying concentration of StarLink kernels.   Using this procedure,
we estimate the concentration at about 0.00093 percent in the corn tested.   This is substantially
less than concentration levels shown in Table 1, which reflect no prior information about the
distribution of StarLink.















* Based on the testing protocol for StarLink in export
shipments  (m=3, n=800).  Test results reported by
FGIS and official agencies.  Source: Robert Lijewski,
USDA-GIPSA.
For perspective, estimated StarLink concentration levels were about 10-fold higher in the 2000
crop year, based on GIPSA test results.
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Risks to buyers and sellers: a Bayesian perspective
As outlined above, the chance of accepting a shipment of grain is conditional on g, the
proportion of biotech (or StarLink) kernels in the population from which the sample is drawn.
We now consider a situation in which g is unknown, but buyers or sellers of grain have prior
                                                
4 Source: Larry D. Freese (GIPSA-USDA), personal communication.   It should be emphasized that samples
submitted to GIPSA for StarLink testing are not from randomly selected lots.   Tests are conducted at the request of
the applicant.8
beliefs that can be represented by probability distributions.   Beliefs may be modified (updated)
on the basis of test results.
Assume that a buyer has a tolerance level for presence of biotech kernels (which may be
arbitrarily close to zero) and that grain is tested before purchase.  Based on the test result, the
grain will be either accepted or rejected by the buyer.  The seller does not have perfect
information about the content of biotech kernels, but can assign probabilities to a grain shipment
having high or low levels (relative to the buyer’s tolerance).  Let P(H) denote the (subjective)
probability of a high level, and P(L) the probability of a low level.  Probabilities that the buyer’s
test will indicate ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ are denoted P(A) and P(R), respectively. Outcomes can be
represented as follows:
Test result
Accept (A) Reject (R ) Marginal
Low (L) P(L,A) P(L,R) P(L) Biotech
concent. High (H) P(H,A) P(H,R) P(H)
Marginal P(A) P(R ) 1.0
Joint probabilities are shown within the box.  For example, P(L,A) is the joint probability of a
low concentration and acceptance, and P(L,R) is the joint probability of low concentration and
rejection.  Marginal probabilities sum to one, and joint probabilities sum to marginal
probabilities.
Conditional probabilities are defined via Bayes’ rule.  For example, the conditional
probability of H, given A, is given by
). ( / ) , ( ) | ( A P A H P A H P =
This represents the buyer’s risk—the risk that grain has a high concentration of biotech content
despite a favorable test result.  Seller’s risk can be interpreted in different ways.  From the9
seller’s perspective, risk could be represented by P(R), the probability of a rejected shipment
(irrespective of the actual concentration), particularly if costs are incurred as a result of the
rejection.  Another interpretation
5 views seller’s risk as the conditional probability of rejection
given low concentration:
) ( / ) , ( ) | ( L P R L P L R P = .
In that case the test has led to the wrong conclusion, e.g., because of sampling error.  Buyer and
seller risk (in either form) will reflect the testing protocol, the buyer’s tolerance, and prior beliefs
about the distribution of biotech kernels.
Testing and the value of information
From the buyer’s perspective, the value of information gained from a test could be
represented by
)] | ( ) ( [ A H P H P K V − ⋅ =
where K is the (possibly subjective) unit value of avoiding high levels of biotech kernels, and the
expression in brackets is the reduction in buyer risk associated with testing.   If the value of
information exceeds the unit cost of the test, then testing prior to purchase makes economic sense
for the buyer.
Now consider the incentives for sellers.  Under what conditions will sellers test grain for
biotech content?  To explore this question we construct an example in which market premiums
and discounts play a role, along with testing costs.   Assume that a seller can deliver grain to one
of two markets.  The first is a premium market (where sales are conditional on test results), and
the second is a reserve market (where tests are not conducted).   Grain shipped to the premium
                                                
5 That is the interpretation given by GIPSA in its web briefing, “Sampling for the Detection of Biotech Grains,” p.7.10
market is tested by the buyer.  If biotech kernels are not detected, the buyer accepts the grain and
the seller earns a premium value, Y ($/mt).  If the grain is rejected due to biotech content, it must
be re-routed to another location where it incurs a discount, D.  Alternately, the seller could avoid
testing by bypassing the premium market and shipping directly to alternate buyers, where the
grain earns a reserve value, Z.
6  Before deciding where to ship the grain, the seller could conduct
his/her own test, at cost T ($/mt), to gain information about odds of buyer acceptance in the
premium market.   Figure 3 provides a decision tree of the seller’s problem, with chance nodes
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Figure 3: Seller’s Problem as Decision Tree
                                                                                                                                                            
http:www.usda.gov/gipsa/biotech/sample2.htm
6 Values denoted Y, -D and Z can be interpreted as net revenue (per unit) for sales to different markets—after
deduction of costs.11
For plausible parameter values there are three seller strategies to consider.
7   Strategy S1
is to ship directly to the premium market without pre-testing.  Strategy S2 is to bypass the
premium market and ship to the reserve market.  Strategy S3 involves a test prior to shipping, for
which the seller incurs a testing cost.  If the result is favorable (indicating no biotech content, or
‘accept’), the grain is shipped to the premium market; otherwise it is shipped to the reserve
market.   Under S3, the probability of acceptance in the premium market is P(A2 | A1).  That is,
the probability of buyer acceptance is conditioned by the first test result (known to the seller
only).   Expected payoffs for the three seller strategies are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Expected payoffs and buyer risks under different strategies.
Seller strategy Seller’s expected payoff Buyer risk
S1 P(A2)⋅Y  –  P(R2)⋅D P(H | A2)
S2 Z Not applicable
S3 P(A1)[P(A2 | A1)⋅Y − P(R2 | A1) ⋅D] + P(R1)⋅Z – T P(H | A2, A1)
Table 4 also shows the buyer risk for each strategy.  (This is not applicable when the
premium market is bypassed, as in S2.)   The buyer’s risk is actually lower under S3, i.e.,
    ) | ( ) , | ( 1 1 2 A H P A A H P <
because under this strategy the grain has been tested twice, and probabilities of ‘high’ levels of
biotech kernels are reduced accordingly. This hinges on our assumption that parameters of the
underlying probability distribution are not known with certainty, so that successive test results
can lead to revision of (subjective) risk assessments.
                                                
7 We assume Y > Z, etc.  In the tree diagram, dominated strategies are indicated by ‘\\’.  For example, it would make
no sense for the seller to test grain and, if the test result were favorable, ship to the reserve market where price is
lower.12
Pre-testing by the seller (S3) works to the advantage of the buyer in the premium market,
by lowering risk.   However, the seller’s optimal strategy depends on multiple factors, including
the premium offered by the buyer (Y), the discount if grain is rejected (D), the reservation price
(Z), and the testing cost (T) and testing protocol.   Pre-testing is not always optimal from the
seller’s perspective.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate how the premium (Y) could affect expected seller payoffs,
holding other parameters fixed.   In each figure, cross-over points are marked where returns are
equalized across strategies.  Thus, payoffs for strategies S1 and S2 are equalized at Y=b; payoffs
for S1 and S3 are equalized at Y=a; and payoffs for S2 and S3 are equalized at Y=c.  In Figure 4,
the range of premiums follows an order where c<b<a.  Note that the payoff for S2 is independent
of the premium (i.e., the function has zero slope).
In Figure 4, there is a range of premiums (c ≤ Y ≤ a) for which strategy S3 (pre-testing) is
optimal.  Below that range strategy S2 is optimal, and above it strategy S1 is optimal.  When the
premium is too low (Y < c), the seller bypasses the premium market.  When it is too high (a <
Y), the seller maximizes expected return by shipping to the premium market without pre-testing.
Figure 5 illustrates a different situation—one in which no premium can induce pre-testing by the
seller.  That would occur if testing costs were prohibitively high, for example.  (Note that cross-




















Figure 5: Seller return as function of premium, version 2.14
Seller strategies carry different implications for buyer risks, as shown in these figures.
However, the buyer and seller do not share the same information.  They may have different prior
beliefs about the distribution of biotech kernels, and results from the seller’s own tests (prior to
shipment) are private information.  There are aspects of a principal-agent problem in this
situation.   The principal (buyer) cannot observe whether the agent (seller) has tested grain prior
to shipment, and hence does not have equally good information about the risk of high
concentration.  The buyer influences the incentives for pre-testing through the choice of premium
(and testing protocol), but must consider two factors.  If the buyer’s premium is too low, the
seller will be driven to an alternative market (participation constraint).  If the premium is too
high, the seller will participate without pre-testing, exposing the buyer to higher risk (incentive
compatibility constraint).
8  In the next section, the tradeoff between participation and buyer risk
will be explored in a simulation analysis.
Testing for Starlink: A Simulation Analysis
The following analysis uses simulation to represent a universe of potential grain sellers,
each with different prior information and opportunity costs.   The likely concentration of
StarLink kernels (as perceived by potential sellers) is represented by a Weibull distribution
9.
This distribution is characterized by two parameters: β, the shape parameter, and θ, the scale
                                                
8 See Gardner, pp. 271-298, for discussion of principal-agent problems using game theory.
9 The Weibull distribution was chosen for illustrative purposes.  Its probability density function (pdf) has the form
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with β>0 and θ>0. The cumulative distribution function (cdf) is given by
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parameter.  Choosing β=0.4 and θ=3x10
-6 produces a distribution that is broadly consistent with
StarLink test results for the past year.
10  However, in the simulation we consider a range of
values for the scale parameter.  This is meant to reflect differences in the prior beliefs of sellers,
with smaller values of θ representing more refined information about the concentration of





Sellers may also differ in terms of their reservation price (opportunity cost).  It seems plausible
that sellers with more refined information (lower value of θ) would have a higher reservation
price—e.g., to ensure recovery of higher costs associated with quality management.  For that
reason, we assume that Z, the seller’s reservation price, is a random variable that is negatively
correlated with θ.  Z is also drawn from a uniform distribution,
Z ∼  UNIF(0 , 10).
The assumed correlation coefficient is –0.5.  Other parameters are fixed.  They include T, the
unit testing cost ($/mt), and D, the unit cost associated with rejected shipments ($/mt).  Initially
we assume T=0 and D=$25.  The buyer is assumed to apply the standard testing procedure for
export shipments (3 samples of 800 kernels each), and the threshold between ‘low’ and ‘high’
concentrations is 0.01%.
11
The simulation is implemented in an Excel spreadsheet using @Risk software.  For each
drawing of the random variables (θ, Z), the spreadsheet calculates the range of buyer premiums
                                                                                                                                                            
(Bain and Engelhardt, pp. 116-117.)
10 These parameter values were chosen to be consistent with an expected concentration level of E(x)=0.001%.  The
implied cumulative probability of StarLink concentrations less than 0.01% is 0.983, which is reasonably close to the
percentage of samples testing negative for StarLink in the past year (Table 2).
11 This is equivalent to 1 kernel in 10,000, which is the limit of detection for currently approved test kits.16
that would support different seller strategies, as illustrated above.  Risks to buyers are also
calculated based on the seller’s prior information and (when applicable) test results. 
12
Simulation results are summarized in Figures 6-8.  Each figure shows results for three
different testing protocols, of which ‘A0’ is the most stringent (allowing none of the three test
samples to be positive for StarLink), and ‘A2’ the least (allowing two samples to test positive).
Figure 6 shows how the number of sellers varies with the size of the premium.
13  For each testing
protocol, higher premiums attract a larger share of potential sellers to the premium market.  For
the most stringent protocol, a $10 premium attracts about 40% of potential sellers; less stringent
protocols attract higher shares.   Participation is complete (100% of potential sellers) for all
protocols when the premium reaches $20.
Premiums paid by buyers in the premium market (such as Japan) for StarLink-free corn
might differ, depending on end-use.  For food-use corn, Japanese buyers presently are willing to
pay $8 to $10 per metric ton premium for non-biotech corn that is produced, handled and
distributed under identity preservation to avoid potential StarLink commingling.  This premium
level does not apply to feed-use corn.  However, the U.S.-Japan testing protocol for StarLink
applies to both food- and feed-use corn.
                                                
12 Conditional probabilities are calculated with discrete approximations.  For example, the chance of acceptance
given ‘low’ levels of StarLink (relative to buyer’s tolerance) is given by
) , 800 ; 0 ( 1 ) , 3 ; ( )] ) 1 (( ) ( [ ) | (
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In this calculation, the range of ‘low’ concentration is divided into k equal increments of length h, and c is a lower
bound arbitrarily close to zero (e.g., c=0.00001).   F(j) is the Weibull cdf.  Calculations of P(A | H) are similar.
Given conditional probabilities, other relevant probabilities are derived via Bayes’ rule and adding-up properties.



































Figure 8: Impact of premium on risks to buyers.18
Of the sellers who ship to the premium market, not all choose to test grain prior to
shipment.  Figure 7 shows that the share of sellers who pre-test is highest under the most
stringent testing protocol.  The share of sellers who pre-test declines with higher premium levels,
so that under all protocols there is insufficient incentive for pre-testing when the premium
reaches $25.
Figure 8 shows the combined impact of seller numbers (participation rates) and testing
decisions on buyer risk.  Under the most stringent protocol (A0), average buyer risks increase
with the premium.  However, under the least stringent protocol (A2), buyer risk falls slightly (for
premiums between $5 and $10) before stabilizing.  This modest decline in buyer risk is due to
the expanded number of sellers.
A more accurate test for StarLink: impact of lot size and testing cost
For comparison, we conducted a simulation using a different testing protocol—one based
on a single sample of 10,000 kernels.  This represents the most sensitive of commercially
available tests for StarLink.  Previously, we assumed that testing costs were zero; that is in line
with the use of the lateral flow strip test, a protein-based method that is stipulated in the U.S. and
Japan StarLink testing protocol.  The more sensitive micro-titer well test kit can detect 1
StarLink kernel in 10,000, but this costs more and takes 2-4 hours to complete. The retail cost is
around $195 to $200, and the cost charged by private laboratories varies from $35 to $100 per
test.  A more typical range is between $45 and $75 per test (Kendall).
The size of the corn lot also affects the per-unit cost.  Typical lot size varies from about
800 bushels (20.3 metric tons) for a truck load, to 3,570 bushels (100 short tons) for a hopper car,19
and to 50,000-55,000 bushels (1,330 metric tons) for a barge.  Thus, test cost per metric ton
ranges from $3.33 for truck, $0.74 for hopper car, and $0.05 for barge.
Simulation results are shown in Figures 9-11.  Impacts of the premium on the number of
sellers, share of sellers who pre-test, and buyer risk vary by lot size.  Sellers appear to have little
incentive to ship to the premium market when the premium falls below $20 per metric ton (Fig.
9).  The number of sellers rises as the premium exceeds $20/mt, but this varies by lot size.  The
number of sellers is highest for barge-size lots, as the test cost is spread over a much larger grain
volume.  Conversely, the number of sellers is lowest when testing is by truckload.
Sellers find little incentive to pre-test for the presence of StarLink corn in their shipments
if the buyer’s premium falls below $15 per metric ton, given positive testing costs (Fig. 10).
However, there is interest of pre-testing for barge and hopper car shipments if the premium
exceeds $15 or $20 per metric ton.  The hike is particularly stiff for barge shipment--over 90
percent of the sellers would pre-test for the presence of StarLink if the premium exceeds $20/mt.
Sellers have no incentive to pre-test for truck shipment even if the premium reaches $30/mt due
to high per-unit testing costs.
Buyer risk is inversely related to share of sellers who pre-test for the presence of StarLink
kernels (Fig. 11).  In the case of truck shipments, higher per-unit test cost discourages the sellers
from pre-testing; as a result, buyer risk becomes greater.  In contrast, lower per-unit testing costs






































Figure 11.  Impact of premium on buyer risk by lot size21
Concluding remarks
Tests for the presence of biotech grain expose buyers and sellers to new risks.  In
combination with premiums and discounts, these risks can be an important aspect of procurement
and marketing decisions.  Buyers who wish to exclude biotech grains can influence their risk
through their choice of testing protocol (e.g., sample size, single vs. multiple sample plans).
Buyer risk is also influenced by the size of the price premium offered for non-biotech purchases.
Higher premiums can actually add to buyer risk, either because of participation effects (adverse
selection of sellers) or because of reduced incentives for seller pre-testing.   Risks facing sellers
must be viewed in the context of marketing alternatives.  Incentives for sellers to test grain prior
to shipment depend on a number of factors: applicable premiums and discounts, testing costs,
and prior beliefs about the concentration of biotech kernels.
Simulation analysis provides a flexible means for investigating these effects—
particularly when there is uncertainty about underlying distributions.  In our experiments,
simulation was used to represent a universe of potential sellers, each with different prior beliefs
and opportunity costs.  Ceteris paribus, sellers with more refined information about the ‘true’
concentration of biotech kernels have less incentive to test grain prior to shipment.  Pre-testing is
more advantageous when priors are diffuse.
Estimated concentrations of StarLink in tested corn (based on results collected by official
agencies) are now substantially lower than in 2000, when contamination of processed foods was
first reported.  However, testing protocols remain in effect for export shipments to Japan, and
some domestic manufacturers maintain more stringent tests.   Commercial test kits can now
promise detection of one StarLink kernel in ten thousand, but at a cost that limits their appeal for22
bulk grain handlers.  This points to the inherent difficulty of satisfying a ‘zero-tolerance’
standard for unapproved biotech events.
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